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Most teams that say they have a disaster recovery plan really have a document and a hope. DisasterRecoveryOps is the habit of running recovery as a living operational practice: objectives that are measured, a strategy that matches each service, and drills that produce numbers. This checklist is written for engineers who run production systems and want to audit where they stand in one working session.
The Ops Atlas frames the topic well in its entry on DisasterRecoveryOps, and it also admits the label itself is rare and overlaps with older terms. That candour is useful: do not worry about the name, worry about whether the items below are true for your estate.
How to use this audit
Score every line as yes, partly or no. Anything marked partly counts as no until you can show evidence, such as a drill report, a dated runbook or a ticket. Run the audit per service tier rather than for the whole company, because a billing database and an internal wiki should not be held to one standard.
Section 1: objectives you can defend
- Every service carries both a time-to-recover target and a data-loss target. Write both next to the service name, and check that the business owner, not only the platform team, has signed them.
- The RPO is stated as a moment in time. NIST treats it as the point to which data must be restored, so “we can lose five minutes” must be tied to a replication or backup mechanism that actually delivers it.
- Zero is not used as a default. If every service claims zero loss and zero downtime, nothing has been prioritised and the budget will not stretch.
- Tiers exist and are short. Three tiers are usually enough: an hour-scale tier on standby capacity, a working-day tier on a pilot-light setup, and a multi-day tier restored from backups.
Section 2: the clock includes the people
This is where most audits find the biggest gap. A recovery clock does not start when the failover script starts. It starts when the failure begins to hurt, and it keeps running while someone notices, escalates and decides to invoke the plan.
- Detection time is measured in drills. Record the minutes from injected fault to the first person acknowledging it.
- Someone holds invocation authority, and a deputy exists. Name roles, not individuals, and make sure the on-call rota actually covers nights and holidays.
- A decision deadline is written down. The Atlas builds it by starting from the RTO and subtracting both the slowest drill you have run lately and a buffer for surprises. Take a one-hour objective, a slowest drill of 33 minutes and a 5-minute margin, and the answer comes out at 22 minutes. If the deadline passes without a decision, the plan says what happens by default.
- Decision latency is tracked separately from technical time. In the Atlas worked example a drill spent 31 minutes on people and 33 on systems, which produced a 64-minute total against a 60-minute objective.
Teams already running event correlation will recognise the problem of too much signal arriving at once. If your alert pipeline is noisy, the detect-and-decide share of the clock grows, which is why a piece on taming alert floods with smarter tooling belongs next to this audit rather than apart from it.
Section 3: strategy matches the tier
- Each tier names one of the standard patterns. The common vocabulary is backup and restore, pilot light, warm standby, hot standby and multi-site active/active.
- Zone redundancy is not counted as recovery. Spreading across availability zones protects against a building problem; it does not cover a regional event or a provider control plane fault.
- Effective RPO is calculated across every store. The service is only as current as the most lagged datastore it needs, including queues, caches and object storage, not just the primary database.
- Replication is not treated as a copy you can rewind. Corruption and a bad deployment replicate happily, so point-in-time copies must exist alongside any mirrored tier.
- Capacity is reserved or proven obtainable. Quotas, machine images and any scaling steps in the provider control plane are checked for staleness.
Section 4: the failover procedure itself
- The order is written: fence, promote, redirect. Stop the old side from accepting writes first, promote the data tier second, and move traffic last.
- Fencing gaps are listed. Turning off a DNS route moves only the traffic that honours DNS. Scheduled jobs, message consumers and clients holding cached answers can bypass it, so each needs its own switch.
- Failover and switchover are distinguished. A planned switchover can be arranged to lose nothing; an unplanned failover can drop writes that had not yet replicated.
- A reconciliation method exists for lost writes. Preserve the old primary before anything else, compare against a restored clone of the data instead of live production, and replay changes through the application so idempotency rules still apply.
- Automatic failover on a health check is justified in writing. Cloud documentation itself says to use it with caution, because a flapping check can trigger a split-brain situation.
- No console clicking. A procedure that depends on someone remembering which buttons to press in a web console is an anti-pattern; scripts or pipelines should carry it.
Section 5: access during the bad day
Recovery steps often fail on a mundane point: nobody can sign in. In an October 2025 regional outage, token service and single sign-on problems were part of the picture, which makes the lesson concrete.
- Break-glass credentials live outside the failure domain. A vault hosted in the same region you are evacuating does not count.
- Those credentials are tested on a schedule. Log in with them during every drill.
- Disk encryption recovery keys are retrievable offline. Mass endpoint recoveries after a faulty content update in July 2024 sometimes needed them for every affected machine.
Section 6: drills and evidence
- Coverage is a number. The Atlas example shows 67 percent drill coverage; set a target of full coverage for tier one and report it monthly.
- Two consecutive drills inside the RTO is the bar for calling a tier exercised. One lucky run proves little.
- Failback is rehearsed. Returning to the original site is a second migration, and plans that skip it leave teams running on temporary capacity for months.
- Staging comes first, production later. Start with a staging switchover, then graduate tier-one services to a controlled production drill.
- Every drill closes with a dated action list. Each finding gets an accountable person and a target date, and the previous list is reviewed first next time.
Section 7: regulation and standards check
If you serve financial entities in the European Union, the operational resilience regulation that took effect in January 2025 expects regular testing of recovery plans. Separately, NIST SP 800-34 and ISO 22301 give structure to impact analysis and continuity planning. Confirm with your compliance team which of these applies to you; this audit only tells you whether your technical evidence would stand up to the question.
Reading your score
Tally the yes answers per section. Anything under half in sections 2 and 6 is the first fix, because those two decide whether the other four matter. A sensible first month looks like this: inventory services and tiers, agree objectives with owners, write the decision deadline, and book a staging switchover.
Finally, give the audit a home in your decision process. The same reasoning applied in how data-driven tooling can inform IT choices applies here: the numbers from your drills are inputs, and a person with authority still has to make the call within the deadline you set. Re-run this checklist every quarter and keep the dated results; the trend is the evidence.